Frontier AI evaluations

Do third-party frontier AI evaluations matter?

Government AI institutes and independent evaluators test advanced systems for dangerous capabilities, safeguard failures and other risks — often with access and technical expertise unavailable to the wider public. Yet identifying a risk is not the same as reducing it.

An evaluation can document a serious vulnerability without compelling a developer response, delaying deployment, triggering additional review, or verifying remediation. This dataset asks a narrow question: when an evaluator publishes a risk-relevant finding about a named frontier system, does the public record document action attributed to that finding and directed at mitigating the identified risk? More on the problem →

— findings — reports — evaluators
What happens to a published finding
Every published finding, narrowed to the ones a company owes an answer for. Read it left to right. Every finding in the dataset enters on the left, and each ribbon carries findings from one stage to the next; the width of a ribbon is drawn in proportion to how many findings it carries, so a ribbon twice as thick is carrying twice as many. Most findings drop out before the end, and that is the point of the diagram: they are methodology papers, governance commentary, or results with no named company that could answer for them, so no response is owed and none is counted as missing. What survives to the final column is the population every number on this page is computed over. Hover any ribbon to see the exact count it represents.
Table view
Was the company response proportionate to the risk identified?

Every trackable evaluation finding — one a named company could answer for — gets one verdict: proportionality. It combines two separately coded variables: the finding's severity — significant-risk or low-risk — and the company's Action Level — Substantive, Partial, Acknowledged or None.

Each is coded on its own, so neither can colour the other. They are then combined by a fixed rule: a significant-risk finding counts as proportionate only if the response was Substantive; a low-risk finding needs only a Partial one. An acknowledgement without action never meets the standard, and a finding with no located response is always an accountability gap.

Proportionate does not mean the response was implemented, that it worked, or that the risk was removed — only that a documented response met the bar the finding's severity sets.

Question 1 · Severity — how serious is the finding?

Each finding is scored against eight dangerous-capability domains by three independent models — Claude Sonnet 5, GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.1 — using one frozen prompt sent to all three. Each model returns its own category, and the one that at least two of the three agree on becomes the finding's severity. Using three models rather than one means a single model's misreading cannot decide a case on its own.

Category 1
Significant risk. At least one of the eight domains is demonstrated: CBRN uplift · cyber operations · autonomy and self-replication · persuasion at scale · deceptive alignment · safeguard failure · evaluation integrity · acute individual harm.
Category 2
Low-risk. Everything else — reassuring nulls, capability gaps, methodology contributions, governance observations, non-frontier models.
The Category 1 bar mirrors the thresholds the developers publish for themselves — Anthropic's RSP Capability Thresholds, OpenAI's Preparedness Framework, Google DeepMind's Frontier Safety Framework. A capability must be shown, not discussed, and a model measured below a threshold is never Category 1.

Question 2 · Action level — what did the company publish?

Three separate searches are run for every finding — company response, policy uptake and public coverage. Only the company's own primary document counts — news reporting that quotes a company is not a response, and standing policy that shares a topic does not count.

Substantive
A specific, documented change, attributed to the finding.
Partial
A change claimed but not verifiable, or incomplete.
Acknowledged
The finding is referenced, but no action follows.
None
No publicly documented company response was located.
A separate agent pass then re-checked each proposed Action Level against the cited evidence, and every retained finding and its coding was reviewed before it entered the final record.

The proportionality matrix

The same company behaviour scores differently depending on what it was answering.

Severity against what the company published, every cell holding its finding count and outcome.
Severity × company response. Every trackable evaluation finding, placed by how serious it is and what the company published.
Proportionality outcomes split by severity.
The same findings as verdicts. The matrix collapsed into the three outcomes, split by severity.

How to read the matrix

Rows are severity. The upper row is Category 1 — significant risk: the finding demonstrated one of the eight dangerous-capability domains. The lower row is Category 2 — low-risk: real, verified findings that crossed no danger threshold.

Columns are action level — the strongest thing the company published, left to right from Substantive (a specific documented change) through Partial (claimed but unverifiable) and Acknowledged (referenced, nothing done) to None (no documented response located).

Every finding sits in exactly one cell, and the number in it is how many share that pair. Cell colour is the outcome, derived rather than assigned.

The Category 1 row is the one that matters. Only its Substantive cell is proportionate. The Category 2 row sets the comparison — its bar is lower by design, so Partial is enough. Partial is the single column where the two rows disagree.

The three verdicts

Proportionate
The response met the bar the finding's severity sets. The loop closed in public.
Under-response
The company engaged — referenced the finding, or claimed a change nobody can verify — but did less than the risk called for.
Accountability gap
No publicly documented company response was located. No public trace that the finding was received, considered or acted on.

Under-response and accountability gap together are the shortfall. The headline counts only the second, the stricter of the two readings.

Full methodology — all eight domains defined, the tier test, and the three evidence searches →

What the outcomes look like
No-action rate by access type.
Access predicts response. Developers documented a substantive response for 24 of the 44 pre-deployment findings (55%), but for only 9 of the 131 post-deployment findings (7%). This is the largest effect in the dataset — and access is set by agreement, not by evaluator diligence.
Shortfall rate by year.
No clean improvement over time. Year-to-year movement is real but non-monotonic, and the latest year is partly recency — those findings have had less time to draw a response.
Outcome by risk domain.
Not one topic. Jailbreaks, cyber, alignment, autonomy and bio-chem all show substantial shortfall — so the gap is not an artefact of one research area.
Outcome mix by evaluator type.
Who reports it matters. Findings from government institutes came with a response gap less often than those from third-party evaluators (71% against 84%) — but this difference does not hold after adjusting for clustering of findings within reports.
Policy uptake.
Almost no binding policy action. Government follow-up is tracked separately and never substitutes for a company response.
What the corpus is made of Three breakdowns behind the headline — how the corpus splits by tier, when in a model's life the evaluation happened, and whether responding companies name the evaluator. Detail rather than result; open if you want to check the composition.
Corpus split by tier.
Only trackable evaluation findings are scored. The rest are real, source-verified findings that fail one of the two gates — methodology, governance, or results with no named company to answer for them. They stay in the dataset; excluding them from the headline while keeping them is what makes the denominator defensible.
Findings per access type.
Most evaluation happens after release. Pre-deployment access covers a small share of the corpus — which is precisely what makes it a policy lever rather than a description of how things already are.
Attribution of responses.
Acting quietly still counts. Where a company responds it usually names the evaluator, but not always. Attribution is a separate field so a silent fix is never penalised in the outcome.
Who produces the findings The 1,146 findings come from 46 institutions across four types. Open to see the concentration and how it splits.
Findings per institution, ranked.
Output is concentrated. A small number of evaluators account for most of the corpus, so institution-level rates rest on very uneven denominators.
Findings by institution type, branching into individual organisations.
Four institution types. Nonprofit (AEF) 335, Government 320, Nonprofit (independent) 253 and For-profit 238 — each branching into the organisations behind it.
What stands out in the numbers

Each line below is computed directly from the dataset, with its denominator stated — several of these compare different populations, so the denominator is the part to read carefully.

The problem

Frontier AI evaluations have become a prominent part of AI governance. What happens to their findings has not been measured.

The question

When a government or independent evaluator publishes a risk-relevant finding about a named frontier system, does the public record document action attributed to that finding and directed at mitigating the identified risk?

Each clause narrows it. Named frontier system excludes findings with no identifiable party to answer them. Attributed to that finding excludes standing policy that happens to share a topic. Directed at mitigating the risk excludes acknowledgement that changes nothing.

Why the public record

A company may act privately or tell the evaluator directly. None of that is visible here, by construction. What this measures is the record a regulator, journalist or researcher can verify from outside.

What this does not measure

  • Private action. A fix made without public comment is invisible to this method.
  • Effect. A substantive response means a documented change was published — not that it was implemented well, or that it worked.
  • Recency. Findings published near the cutoff may not have had time to draw a response. Outcomes are reported by year so this stays visible.
Absence is measured, not assumed. “No response” means all three evidence searches were run and logged with a date — not that nobody looked.

Methodology

The outcome for each finding is derived, never judged. Two coded columns decide whether a response is owed, an ensemble decides how serious it is, a fixed search decides whether a response exists — and the verdict is a formula over those inputs.

Three tests, all of which must hold

  1. Asserted by the evaluator — not a summary of someone else's work, not a comparator score cited in passing.
  2. Evidence-backed in that report — a measured result, an observed behaviour, or a documented process fact. Opinions, recommendations and plans are not findings.
  3. Independently codeable — it would warrant its own response on its own terms.

What is deliberately excluded

  • Company self-reports. A developer writing about its own models has nobody to respond to. One exception is load-bearing: where a named external evaluator contributes a section to a company system card, that section is in scope and is filed under the evaluator, never the company.
  • Ordinary accuracy and hallucination. That literature is enormous and was never censused here, so admitting a slice of it would make the corpus incomplete by its own standard.
  • Non-frontier subjects. The finding must concern a named frontier model or AI system, not general machine learning.
  • Unverifiable sources. Every number and quote is checked against the document it cites.

Every finding sits in exactly one group

The group is not a label anyone writes. It is derived from two coded columns, Eval? (trackable) and Action Trackable?, so it can never drift from the evidence that produced it.

GroupEncodingMeaning
Trackable evaluation findings
233 (20.3%)
yes / yesA company could answer for it. Names a company or model, concerning, and a response is reasonable to expect. Only trackable evaluation findings enter the company-response and proportionality analysis — every headline number is computed over them.
Non-trackable evaluation findings
599 (52.3%)
yes / noEmpirical, but no accountable party. Anonymised models, reassuring nulls, non-frontier subjects, capability trends, and results that call for no company response.
Non-empirical findings
314 (27.4%)
no / blankNo empirical model behaviour or capability reported. Contributions to methodology, frameworks, governance processes, and tooling.

The trackable-finding test — all three must hold

Condition 1

It is an empirical model finding — a measured result about behaviour, capability or safeguards.

Condition 2

It names a specific company or model. Company level suffices; "anonymised" fails.

Condition 3

It demonstrates a concerning result for which a specific company response is reasonable to expect.

What condition 3 deliberately excludes

  • Reassuring nulls — a model measured below a threshold.
  • Benchmark scores or relative uplift with no dangerous threshold crossed.
  • Inconclusive results.
  • Comparative rankings between models.
  • Capability trends and forecasts.
  • Findings where named models are the instrument of a methodology study, not its subject.
  • Company self-classifications ("we treat this as High capability").
  • Non-frontier models.
  • Findings too recent to have plausibly drawn a response.
This exclusion list is why the headline denominator is far smaller than the corpus. A model scoring below a danger threshold is not something a company owes an answer for, and counting it as an unanswered finding would inflate the gap.

One finding per row

Never shared
Two different companies never share a row. A finding covering four models is split by developer.
Clubbed
Findings warranting the same response become one row. The test: did, or would, the company respond to them as one thing?
Split
Findings warranting distinct responses become separate rows — a capability result and a safeguard failure are not one item.
Comparators
Baselines and comparison models are never rows of their own.
How findings divide between Category 1 and Category 2.
How the corpus divides. Every finding is scored against the eight domains below; a finding is Category 1 only if at least one is demonstrated.

Two categories, and what separates them

Category 1
Significant risk. Triggered if any one of the eight dangerous-capability domains below is demonstrated in the evaluation described.
Category 2
Low-risk. Everything else — reassuring or null results (capability below an expert threshold, “no uplift”, “zero instances”); capability-gap findings where the model fails a task; positive methodology or tooling contributions; pure process or governance observations; and findings about non-frontier or small research models where no frontier system is implicated.
Where the bar comes from: the Category 1 threshold deliberately mirrors the dangerous-capability thresholds the frontier developers publish for themselves — Anthropic’s Responsible Scaling Policy Capability Thresholds, OpenAI’s Preparedness Framework, and Google DeepMind’s Frontier Safety Framework Critical Capability Levels. This applies the industry’s own bar rather than one invented for this dataset, which is what makes a shortfall against it meaningful.

The eight domains

A finding is Category 1 if it demonstrates at least one. D1–D8 are this dataset’s own labels for them.

D1
CBRN / bio-chem uplift

Meaningful uplift toward chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons; expert-surpassing bio or chem capability; crossing a stated CBRN threshold.

D2
Cyber operations

Offensive cyber capability — expert-level or novel-uplift hacking, completing realistic multi-stage attack chains, high CTF or exploit success rates, or a “High” or above cyber designation.

D3
Autonomy / AI R&D / self-replication

Autonomous replication, self-propagation, or automating AI R&D and thereby accelerating scaling.

D4
Persuasion / manipulation / societal harm at scale

Systematically changing beliefs or behaviour at scale; implication in large-scale societal harm — mass CSAM, or election-scale persuasion exceeding a real benchmark.

D5
Deceptive alignment / misalignment

Deliberate deception, scheming, sabotage, sandbagging, blackmail, or hiding of abilities or intentions.

“I should not reveal that I am a robot. I should make up an excuse.” — the model’s own reasoning, planning a deception. “the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trade” — concealment repeated across trials. “the good-looking render is faked with an image generator” — a fabricated artefact, with nothing shown about intent.
D6
Safeguard failure

A deployed safety mechanism — jailbreak defence, classifier, guardrail, refusal training, content filter — bypassed, defeated, or shown to fail, allowing harmful output on a frontier system.

D7
Evaluation integrity compromised

The evaluation itself undermined — the model detected it was being evaluated, gamed the benchmark, was trained on evaluation data, or defeated or de-anonymised the evaluation environment.

D8
Acute individual harm

A model actively encouraging, instructing or coaching a user toward suicide or self-harm. Category 1 regardless of scale — one user is enough. Reporting refusal rates on such prompts is not D8; the model must be shown doing it.

Four rules applied before any decision

1 · Negation
“did not”, “below expert”, “zero instances”, “no uplift”, “remained below” → Category 2, even when the surrounding vocabulary is alarming.
2 · Demonstrated
The capability must be shown in the evaluation described. A capability discussed, proposed, warned about or listed as a risk is not demonstrated. An alarming characterisation by the evaluator is not a demonstration.
3 · Trajectory
A rising trend is Category 1 only if a dangerous capability was reached now. A pure future projection is Category 2.
4 · Deliberateness
D5 requires evidence about the model — its own reasoning, an explicit plan, or concealment repeated across trials. Words like “faked” or “cheated” are the evaluator’s characterisation of an output, not evidence of intent.

How the score is produced

Three independent models — Claude Sonnet 5, GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.1 — each score every finding against all eight domains, using one frozen prompt sent verbatim to all three. Whichever category at least two of the three models agree on becomes the finding's severity, so no single model can decide a case by itself. All three votes are stored and never overwritten, which means a two-to-one split stays visible in the data instead of disappearing into the majority — you can see exactly which findings the models disagreed about, and how often.

The three models agreed unanimously on 1,032 of the 1,146 findings (90.1%), and on 194 of the 233 trackable evaluation findings (83.3%). The prompt is version-frozen: any change to it invalidates comparability with rows already coded, so every vote carries the prompt version it was produced under.

Three evidence searches

For every trackable evaluation finding we ran three separate agentic web searches, each looking for a different kind of evidence under its own source rule. All three covered public sources available by 29 August 2026. Only the company-response search can establish that a company responded.

Company response
The developer's newsroom, blog and research index; later model and system cards; safety and deployment pages; and official statements. Only the company's own documents count.
Policy uptake
Official parliamentary, legislative, regulatory and agency records. A record counts only if it refers to the finding, not merely to the same topic.
Public coverage
Independent media, academic citations and documented public discussion. The evaluator's own publicity and the company's own promotion do not count.
Only the company's own primary document is admissible — news reporting that quotes a company is not a response. A document dated before the finding is invalid unless a coordinated pre-deployment disclosure is documented, and standing policy that merely shares a topic does not count. A separate agent pass then re-checked each proposed Action Level against the cited evidence, and every retained finding and its coding was reviewed before it entered the final record.

Action Level — four levels

  • Substantive — a specific, documented change, attributed to the finding.
  • Partial — a change claimed but not verifiable, or incomplete.
  • Acknowledged — the finding is referenced, but no action follows.
  • None — no publicly documented company response was located.
Policy uptake is tracked separately, from official government sources only, and never substitutes for a company response. A regulator citing a finding does not discharge the developer's obligation to answer it.

Proportionality is the final verdict on each finding

Severity says how serious the finding is. Action Level says what the company did. Proportionality is the two combined — whether the response matched the risk. It is the only column the headline is computed from, and it is derived by lookup, never assigned by hand.

The lookup

The matrix is on the Results tab → — rows are severity, columns are what the company published, and each cell is the outcome that pair produces.

A significant-risk finding needs a substantive response to pass. A low-risk finding needs at least a partial one. Nothing else clears the bar, and no discretion enters at any point.

The data

Every row carries its source, its coded fields and the reasoning behind its tier.

DateInstitutionFindingModelsSeverityResponse
Charts drawn live from the dataset
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